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Abstract 
The paper deals with the issue of the relationship between results of examination of the influence of political business cycle on 
the basis of the choice of input variables. There were used nominal and effective tax rates, total tax liability, total tax collection in 
case of individual income tax setting in the Czech Republic in the time period 1993−2014. The results of analysis of the effects 
the electoral cycle on the tax policy determination may differ in relation to the specification of input data and the choice of 
dependent variables. 
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1. Introduction 
Provided that the fiscal policy should be a supportive element of economic growth then the fiscal policy 
determination must correspond with the development of economic indicators and with the impulses creating the 
conditions for it. The fact, that the fiscal policy determination in field of tax policy can be determined by other than 
economic matters, is worrying. On the basis of that, it can mean that its development do not have to be consistent 
with the parameters of the pro-growth policy. It is necessary to distinguish between unintentional deflection of pro-
growth policy because of the existence elements of market failure and intentional deflection of pro-growth policy.  
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This paper is focused on the issue of determination of the tax policy by others than economic aspects. The 
representatives of legislative power are responsible for the implementation of tax policy. Therefore, their behaviour 
and activities can be focused on implementation such measurements that may increase their popularity among voters 
in order to get a higher chances of their re-election in a democratic electoral system. In this context we respect the 
statement of Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze (2013) who add that the existence of political business cycle can arise 
only in the systems of direct elections. The results of realized examination of the influence of political business 
cycle on economic indicators or in more detail on tax policy setting show considerable differences. The question is 
whether they are caused by geographical or time distinction, or by the choice of input variables. The elementary task 
should be the identification of possible input variables which can be used for the examination a relationship between 
electoral cycle and tax policy setting.  
Our effort and objective of this paper is to find differences or to confirm compliances of the results in 
examination of a relationship between electoral cycle and tax policy setting in case of using different input variables 
focusing on the Czech Republic in timeline 1993−2015. 
2. The theory of political business cycle  
The Nordhaus’s (1975) assumption of irrational voters became the object of critique. Therefore Rogoff & Sibert 
(1988) introduced the model political business cycle which is based on the temporary information asymmetries 
between voters and political representatives. It is clear that the governments receive information about its 
competency more quickly than the voters can. Therefore the public sees the government’s competency with a lag. 
As a consequence of that fact it is obvious that the incumbent party can have an incentive to lower taxes in election 
years to show their competency (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). Another significant difference between Nordhaus’s model 
and Rogoff’s model is the fact that Rogoff’s model is more focused on main budgetary components such as 
spending, revenues, deficits and taxes rather than only on macroeconomics indicators. 
There are some studies which dealt with the impact of political business cycle on fiscal policy setting, for 
example Shi & Svensson (2006), Doležalová (2013), Štiková (2007), Brender & Drazen (2005), or Andrikopoulos 
(2004). The researches of mentioned authors are oriented especially on macroeconomics indicators (as Nordhaus, 
1975). Mainly, they use indicators as GDP, the inflation rate or the unemployment rate. 
The realization of tax policy depending on political business cycle has been examined by many researches, for 
example by Foremmy & Riedel (2014), Ehrhart (2013), Mikesell (1978), Petterson-Lidbom (2003), Morozumi, 
Veiga, &Veiga (2014), Andrikopoulos, Loizides, & Prodromidis (2006) or Formanová, David, & Křápek (2015). 
Within their analysis they used different indicators which are classified in the following part.  
3. The approaches for identification the relationship between electoral cycle and tax policy setting  
There are several elementary approaches for identification the effects of electoral cycle on the tax policy setting. 
These approaches differ not only in results, but mainly in the choice of input data especially in case of explanatory 
and explained variables.  
Basically, the possible approaches can be divided into 2 groups. The first one includes the legal tools for tax 
policy determination, such as nominal and effective tax rates, the second one then involves the results of its 
determination and includes total tax collection or total tax liability. The variables which represent the results of tax 
policy determination can be significantly determined by other factors. To eliminate them it is used the participation 
of mentioned indicators on gross domestic product.  
3.1. Total tax collection 
For the purpose of examination a relationship between electoral cycle and tax policy it can be primarily used the 
indicator of share of selected tax collection as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of total tax collection. The 
objective of Ehrhart (2013) was to analyse the impact of the electoral cycle calendar on the composition of tax 
revenue (direct versus indirect taxes). For testing she used the indicator of total tax collection. She analysed data of 
56 developing countries over 1980−2006 time periods. Formanová & Křápek (2015) focused on tax collection of 
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employment income and self-employed income on the territory of the Czech Republic on timeline 1993−2013. For 
that purpose, they analysed the changes in average values of tax collection (tax liability) as a percentage of GDP. 
The concept of Morozumi, Veiga, & Veiga (2014) was much wider. These authors focused on electoral effects in 
107 countries during 1975 and 2010. Within their analysis they used the same indicator as previous authors. 
Khemani (2004) examined the influence of electoral cycle on tax collection of individual taxes without using ratio 
index. In his research he focused on 13 States of India and analysed a relationship between local taxes and political 
business cycle in case of 3 000 municipal units during 8 years. Results of Ehrhart (2013) revealed significant pre-
electoral political budget cycle. She found out that the political representatives use especially indirect taxes (e.g. 
value added tax) to increase their popularity prior parliamentary election. Morozumi, Veiga, & Veiga (2014) 
concluded their research with the statement that in tax policy determination, income taxes are reduced in election 
years more often than other taxes. Differently, Formanová & Křápek (2015) did not confirm the existence of 
political business cycle in individual income tax policy focusing on employment income. In research of Kleina & 
Sakuraib (2015), the authors also confirmed the existence of municipal electoral cycle on tax policy setting, 
moreover the same was confirmed by Khemani (2004) in case of developing countries.  
3.2. Total tax liability 
The indicator of total tax collection was an object of critique of Foremmy & Riedel (2014) or Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2003). As the most significant disadvantage of this indicator the authors consider the reduced ability of the tax 
authority to collect taxes. From that reason, it is possible to include to our analysis the alternative indicator – total 
tax liability which eliminates the effects of disability to collect tax revenues. Formanová & Křápek (2015) in 
previous mentioned research analysed whether the electoral cycle has the impact on the tax setting behaviour in field 
of individual income via the indicator of total tax liability as a percentage of GDP. They did not confirm the pre-
election and election manipulation in the field of individual income tax policy with the aim to win next 
parliamentary election. In post-election years there were not significant changes (decrease) in case of self-employed 
tax-payers. In case of employment income, the values of analysed indicators rose, so it corresponds with political-
business cycle assumptions.  
3.3. Nominal tax rates 
The indicators of tax rates as tools how to examine the effects of electoral cycle on tax policy setting are 
especially used because of a lack of indicators taking into account the results of tax policy determination. Foremmy 
& Riedel (2014) stated that the indicator of total tax collection is not the most convenient way how to test the impact 
of electoral cycle on tax policy setting because the fluctuations in total tax collection may be caused by other factors, 
for example it can be influenced by the government´s inability to administer the tax collection. Petterson-Lidbom 
(2003) states that it is more suitable to use the tax rate itself instead of indicator of total tax collection. He expresses 
in favor of tax rates because they have advantage of more closely reflecting of elected governments´ intensions. 
Simple, but objective reason why to use nominal tax rates is mentioned by Macnaughton, Matthews, & Pittman 
(1998). The effective tax rates are often less visible than the nominal tax rates. Johnson, Lynch, & Walker (2005) 
believe that the overall share of tax on GDP is a composite statistic which is unlikely to have any direct relationship 
to the fiscal experience of voters and it is inadequate to the task. This is the reason why they preferred the 
examination of nominal tax rates to effective tax rates. Although their sample contained only two household types 
and five income levels, this sample together encompassed a large proportion of the British electorate.  
In contrast with Andrikopoulos, Loizides, & Prodromidis (2006), who did not confirmed the existence of the 
effect of the electoral cycle on the tax policy setting, other authors in their researches confirmed the existence of this 
effect. In case of Foremmy & Riedel (2014), German nominal corporate income tax rates were used in time period 
2000 to 2008. Mikesell (1978) tested the changes in nominal tax rates of various types of taxes on timeline 1960 to 
1978 on the territory of the USA.  
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3.4. Effective tax rates 
However, the nominal tax rates also have some disadvantages. We cannot consider them as a sufficiently 
objective indicator how to make a comparison of tax burden of individual group of tax payers. For those purposes, 
the effective tax rates are being calculated. Final determination of them takes into account various elements in tax 
base determination or calculation a final tax liability. These factors belong to the field which can be used by the 
representatives of public policy holders more often than the indicator of nominal tax rates. As a consequence of that 
they may implement voters´ attractive tax policy to increase their popularity among selected group of taxpayers 
which furthermore can lead to a higher chance of re-election. On the basis of that it is possible to consider the 
effective tax rates as a convenient instrument how to identify the existence of electoral cycle in tax policy setting. 
This idea is also confirmed by Brychta (2010) whose research was oriented on the calculation of effective tax rates 
of selected tax payers of individual income tax on the territory of the Czech Republic. Moreover, Brychta (2010) 
encourages to test the development of effective tax rates of income tax depending on the changes in political field. 
Formanová, David, & Křápek (2015) tested whether the political business cycle has the impact on the tax setting 
behaviour in individual income tax focusing on employment income on the territory of the Czech Republic on 
timeline 1996−2012. This research did not confirm the existence of the impact of electoral cycle on individual 
income tax policy setting. Johnson, Lynch, & Walker (2005) found out that politicians think that tax matters at 
election time when they used the effective rate, which represents the proportion of a person’s total income paid in 
income tax. Politicians have acted as if the rate of income tax has been a key determinant of voter loyalty. 
4. Methodology  
Within our analysis it was examined whether there are on the 5% significance level changes in average values of 
the input indicators, such as nominal tax rates and effective tax rates, furthermore total tax collection and tax 
liability of individual income tax. In all cases the differences of indicators were used and they were modified 
according to following formula: 
1tt indicatorindicatorΔindicator   (1) 
To fulfil the objective of this paper the t-test was used and following hypotheses were verified:  
1) In pre-election years (a year before parliamentary election) and in election year, there is an intentional 
decrease of the input indicators.  
2) In post-election years (a year after parliamentary election) the restrictive tax-policy setting is implemented 
which is expressed by an increase of analysed indicators. 
Our research was focused on the data for the Czech Republic and for maximal possible timeline 1993–2014. 
During this time period there were 6 parliamentary elections. In accordance with the recommendation of Khemani 
(2004) and respecting the theory of political business cycle and the unpredictability of early election (1998 and 
2013), the early elections were excluded from the analysis. Additional main characteristics are presented in Table 1 
which includes information about type of election (regular or early) and their term.  
Table 1. The identification of election years 
Year Type of election Term of election 
1996 regular 31.5. – 1.6.1996 
1998 early 19.6. – 20.6.1998 
2002 regular 14.6. – 15.6.2002 
2006 regular 2.6. – 3.6.2006 
2010 regular 28.5. – 29.5.2010 
2013 early 25.10. – 26.10.2013 
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In the context of identification of the relationship between tax policy and electoral cycle, the input data can be 
divided into 2 elementary groups. Firstly, there is data expressing the legal determination of tax policy, such as 
nominal and effective tax rates. Secondly, the analysis can be focused on the results of realization of tax policy, in 
that case the indicators total tax collection or total tax liability are used.  
The values of nominal tax rates were calculated according to the individual income tax Acts which were valid in 
individual years of analysed timeline. The calculation of values was divided into 2 time periods. From 1993 until 
2007 there were progressive tax rates on the territory of the Czech Republic. From that reason, final nominal tax 
rates were calculated on the level of n-fold average wage. We chose 67%, 100%, 133%, 167% and 200% of average 
wage. Since 2008 there have been a constant flat rate 15%. The values of average wage were obtained from Czech 
statistical office (2014).  
Table 2. Average annual wage (CZK) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Average annual wage 70,848 84,048 99,684 117,900 129,624 141,612 153,564 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average annual wage 158,628 172,536 186,288 197,160 209,592 220,128 234,552 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Average annual wage 251,484 271,104 280,128 286,368 293,460 300,804 300,936 
 
From various representatives of effective tax rates, the indicator which is annually published by the OECD 
(2015) in document “Taxing Wages” was chosen. The indicator is called PATR which means personal average tax 
rate. The calculation is based on the earnings of a full-time adult employee worker, namely for 8 model taxpayers 
(households) which are according to the OECD considered as the most significant. Each group is determined by 
marital status, a number of children, principal earner and secondary earner, furthermore each household contains a 
full-time adult employee working in one of a broad range of industry sectors of each OECD economy. Some of the 
households also have a spouse working less than full-time. It is assumed that the taxpayers have no income source 
other than employment and cash benefits. For details see Formanová, David, & Křápek (2015). The final value of 
indicator was calculated according to following formula:  
earningswagegross
benefitscashonscontributiemployeetaxincomepersonalofsum
PATR
   (2) 
The indicator of tax liability is also an indicator which can be used for the testing the influence of the existence of 
political business cycle, see Formanová & Křápek (2015). The values of total tax liability were obtained from 
annual reports published by Financial Administration of the Czech Republic (2015). Furthermore, the values were 
classified according to type of the activity (employment income and self-employed income). The values of total 
liability were subsequently modified according to following formula:  
GDP
liabilitytax incomeindividual
GDP of percentage a asliability tax    (3) 
On the basis of critique of indicator of total tax liability, see above Foremmy & Riedel (2014), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2003), or Formanová & Křápek (2015), the indicator of total tax collection was included to this research. 
The data was also obtained from annual reports published by Financial Administration of the Czech Republic 
(2015). The values of total collection were modified according to following formula:  
GDP
collectiontax incomeindividual
GDP of percentage a ascollectiontax   (4)
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All received results from above mentioned input variables will be subsequently compared with the aim i) to 
confirm the compliance of results regardless the type of input data, or ii) to identify differences in results depending 
on the choice of input variables. Furthermore, the received results will be compared with the conclusions of studies 
which dealt with the issue of the effects of electoral cycle on tax policy determination.  
5. Results  
5.1 Nominal tax rates of individual income tax 
Firstly, the changes of differences of nominal tax rates were analyzed in relation to the term of parliamentary 
election. In Table 3 there are presented received results. According to the theoretical assumption we expected the 
decrease of nominal tax rates prior and in election years. On the 5% significance level the null hypothesis was 
rejected in case of all n-fold level of average wage. These results can be interpreted as there were no statistically 
significant changes in the input indicator prior and in election years in comparison with non-election years. In post-
election year, the theoretical assumption predicts the restrictive tax policy which can include the increase of nominal 
tax rates of individual income tax. The obtained results of t-test show insignificant increases of that indicator, 
therefore the null hypothesis was also rejected.  
Table 3. Results of t-test for nominal tax rates on the level of n-fold average wage 
 Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis C 
 
α = 0.05 
The decrease of 
nominal rates prior 
parliamentary 
election year (t-1) 
The decrease of 
nominal rates in 
election year (t) 
The increase of 
nominal rates in post-
election year (t+1) 
0.67 AW 0.545 0.288 0.245 
1,00 AW 0.394 0.062 0.243 
1,33 AW 0.336 0.586 0.480 
1.67 AW 0.433 0.653 0.308 
2.00 AW 0.504 0.239 0.730 
Results of verified 
hypotheses H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 rejected 
 
All in all, we cannot confirm the existence of political business cycle in individual income tax policy 
determination on the basis of the indicator of nominal tax rates. The results can be influenced by the fact that since 
2008 there have been a flat tax rate at a constant level of 15%. Therefore, we are going to include to our research the 
indicator of effective tax rates which reflects other aspects of tax policy determination. 
5.2 Effective tax rates of individual income tax 
Secondly, our research was focused on the changes in the effective tax rates of model taxpayers. All model 
taxpayers include only taxpayers with employment income. As in case of nominal tax rates we tested 3 null 
hypotheses. In the beginning we analyzed whether there were statistically significant changes in effective tax rates 
prior and in election years. From Table 4 it is clear that on the 5% significance level the null hypothesis about a 
decline of personal average tax rates was rejected in case of all model tax payers, in other words there was no 
significant decrease of PATR prior and in election years in comparison with the other years. Furthermore, the 
theoretical assumption of an increase of PATR was tested in case of post-election years. The obtained results show 
statistically significant changes in post-election years in analyzed indicator, therefore the hypothesis about the rise of 
PATR was not rejected on the 5% significance level.  
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Table 4. Results of t-test for effective tax rates for model taxpayers 
 Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis C 
 
α = 0.05 
The decrease of 
PATR prior 
parliamentary 
election year (t-1) 
The decrease of 
PATR in election 
year (t) 
The increase of 
PATR in post-
election year (t+1) 
TP1 −0.908 0.719 2.579 
TP2 −1,554 0.663 2.972 
TP3 −1,400 −0.737 2.456 
TP4 0.244 −1.552 0.729 
TP5 0.189 −0.516 0.273 
TP6 0.134 0.420 −0.207 
TP7 −0.480 0.256 −0.099 
TP8 −0.995 0.763 3.004 
Results of verified 
hypotheses H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 not rejected 
 
Summarizing the results on the changes in the effective tax rates of model taxpayers, we did not identify 
considerable declines in PATR prior and in election years. On the contrary, in post-election years the null hypothesis 
about re-increased PATR was not rejected.  
5.3 Total tax collection of individual income tax  
Furthermore, our analysis was extended of the changes in individual income tax collection as a percentage of GDP. 
Based on the input data, the overall results are presented in Table 5 for employment income and self-employed 
income separately. Prior election year the null hypothesis about the intentional changes (decrease) was rejected on 
the 5% significance level. In election year it was examined whether the average values of analyzed indicator differs 
significantly from the other years. From received results it is clear that the values do not vary significantly, therefore 
our theoretical assumption about attractive tax policy setting in election year was rejected on the 5% significance 
level. It is important to notice that the interpretation of results is same for both types of individual income tax.  
Table 5. Results of t-test for individual income tax collection as percentage of GDP 
 Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis C 
 
α = 0.05 
The decrease of 
indicator prior 
parliamentary 
election year (t-1) 
The decrease of 
indicator in election 
year (t) 
The increase of 
indicator in post-
election year (t+1) 
Employment 
income 0.768 0.757 0.053* 
Self-employed 
income 0.437 0.641 0.226 
Results of verified 
hypotheses H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 rejected 
* critical value 
 
In post-election years it was tested whether there is a statistically significant increase in average values of analyzed 
indicator in comparison with other years. This could be explained by realization the restrictive tax policy. The 
received results are presented in Table 5. In case of self-employed income there are no statistically significant 
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changes in analyzed indicators and the null hypothesis was rejected on 5% significance level. Although the null 
hypothesis about an increase of analyzed indicator was rejected in case of employment income, the input data shows 
slight increases of a share of tax collection as a percentage of GDP in post-election years.  
5.4 Total tax liability of individual income tax  
Finally, the indicator of total tax liability of individual income tax was included to our analysis. The received results 
are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6. Results of t-test for individual income tax liability as percentage of GDP 
 Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis C 
 
α = 0.05 
The decrease of 
indicator prior 
parliamentary election 
year (t-1) 
The decrease of 
indicator in election 
year (t) 
The increase of 
indicator in post-
election year (t+1) 
Employment 
income 0.769 0.758 0.053* 
Self-employed 
income 0.437 0.641 0.226 
Results of verified 
hypotheses H0 rejected H0 rejected H0 rejected 
* critical value 
 
The individual values of t-test are consistent with the results in case of total tax collection of individual income tax. 
To conclude it, we cannot confirm the pre-election and election manipulation in the field of individual income tax 
policy with the aim to win next parliamentary election. In post-election years, the null hypothesis was also rejected. 
However the input data in case of employment income shows a slight increase of analyzed indicator.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Within the examination of the influence of electoral cycle on tax policy setting focusing on individual income tax 
we chose indicators which are often used in similar analysis or moreover those that react to the disadvantages of 
them. Namely, we included to our analysis indicators such as Nominal tax rates of individual income tax, Effective 
tax rates of individual income tax, Total tax collection and Total tax liability of individual income tax. The results of 
realized studies of the influence the electoral cycle on tax policy are not homogenous. In case of using the variables 
from legal determination of tax policy, there is a confirmation of political business cycle, e.g. in Mikesell (1978) or 
Johnson, Lynch, & Walker (2005), but on the other hand Andrikopoulos, Loizides, & Prodromidis (2006) did not 
confirm it. Similarly inconsistent results are obtained in case of using the variables reflecting the result of realization 
of tax policy. For example Morozumi, Veiga, & Veiga (2014) or Kleina, & Sakuraib (2015), in contrast with Ehrhart 
(2013), identified the relationship between electoral cycle and tax policy setting in case of direct taxes. The essential 
question of this paper was whether the choice of input variable can significantly influence its results. Our 
examination of the influence of electoral cycle on individual income tax policy setting was realized in case of the 
Czech Republic. The obtained findings are in Table 7.  
The hypothesis about a decrease of all analyzed input variables was rejected in pre-election years. Furthermore, 
we also rejected a decline of all analyzed input variables in election year. However, the differences in results are 
visible in case of post-election year. It is necessary to mention the obvious influence of a choice of a type of the 
activity which was examined in case of total tax collection or total tax liability of individual income tax. The input 
data was divided into employment income and self-employed income. Moreover, it is clear that the examination of 
effects of an increase of tax burden in post-election year has different conclusions even without tax income 
specification. Apart from evident factors of geographical determination of research, scope of research or its timeline, 
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we identified the influence of a choice of input variables. Even though it was observed only in one segment of our 
research focusing on individual income tax in the Czech Republic. In the future it is convenient to continue in this 
paper started research by examination of larger sample of data which allow us to include longer time series or more 
countries. 
Table 7. Summary conclusions 
 Hypothesis A Hypothesis B Hypothesis C 
 
α = 0.05 
The decrease of 
variable prior 
parliamentary 
election year (t-1) 
The decrease of 
variable in election 
year (t) 
The increase of 
variable in post-
election year (t+1) 
Nominal tax rates (all n-fold of AW) Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Effective tax rates (employment income) Rejected Rejected Not rejected 
Total tax collection as a percentage of GDP  Rejected Rejected Rejected* 
Total tax liability as a percentage of GDP  Rejected Rejected Rejected* 
Conclusion NO NO NO 
* It is necessary to mention that the results can vary based on the type of income. The hypotheses in case of both types of 
income were rejected on 5% significance level, but from input data of employment income it is clear that there is a slight 
post-election increase.  
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